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Case No. 7700 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORENZO VERNAL EWELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL C-OMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
BYRON EWELL, doing business as 
ASSOCIATED CONSTRUC.TION 
COMPANY and THE STATE: 
INSURANC.E FUND, 
Defendants. 
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WRIT OF REVIEW FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION · 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~ ·_ v w:\ T;~~DwiGHT L. KING, 
l Jl -1 -~· .. .1 JL J:! Attorney for Plaintiff, 
J : __ ·. i_ ':~ _. i ·• CJ :~ -: 530 Judge Building, 
.. _____ _______ _ ·--· -··-·· ... --- --· ~ -.. - c·----c·· Salt Lake City, Utah. : 
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IN THE S·UPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORENZO VERNAL EWELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
BYRON EWELL, doing business as 
ASSOCIATED CONSTRUC'TION 
COMPANY and THE STATE 
INSURANC.E FUND, 
Defendants. 




Plaintiff herein will be referred to throughout as 
plaintiff; The Industrial Commission will be referred 
to as commission, and Byron Ewell and The State Insur-
ance Fund as defendants. 
All italics are ours. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter comes before this court on a Petition 
for Writ of Cr.rtiqrari file,d by plainti~ ?:0. or about the 
18th day of September, 1950. Plaintiff's application for 
workmen's compensation was heard by The Industrial 
Commission on the 22nd d~! ?f N oye.~ber, 1950 and on 
the 5th day of March, 1951 The Industrial Commission 
made its decision and denied a portion of plaintiff's 
claim, namely, all medical expense incurred in the re-
moval 9f t4e pterygium grQwt:q on plaintiff's left eye, 
,- - . - - - ' ' ;, ' ' • ''- l ---
and corp.pe.nsation for th~ period Qf time which he was 
) I ' • " ~ 
disabled following t4e surgica~ operatio:n on said growth. 
The commission in its Finding~ of Fact and Con-
; • J ' • - ~ 
elusions of Law f~u~d that plaintiff received a flash 
from a welders torch on May 29, 1950, while in the course 
of his employment and that the flash caused a severe 
inflammation and blister in plaintiff's eye. It further 
found that the inflammation caused was not successfully 
reduced until July 21, 1950. Plaintiff's eye was oper-
ated on by Dr.. Berman on the 29th day of July, 1950 
~ • I I I 
at the Holy C·ross Hospital in Salt Lake City (R. 16). 
The operation consisted of transplanting the pterygium 
to a portio:p. of the eye where it would grow without 
affec~ing the sight (R. 13). Pterygium is a growth of 
the conjunctivial tissue caused by irritation of the eye, 
such as results from dust, wind and sand striking the 
eyeball. It is traumatic in its nature (R. 13). 
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.. -
A pterygium had been removed from plaintiff's 
right eye in 1948 and at that time the pterygium in the 
left eye was noted but it was not of sufficient size to 
necessitate an operation (R. 13). Dr. Berman did not 
see plaintiff between August of 1948 and July of 1950 
(R. 13). The condition that was present in plaintiff's 
eye in 1948 was one 'vhich would not disappear without 
medical treatment, but the pterygium present at that 
time was not affecting plaintiff's clear vision. By July 
14, 1950, the pterygium had increased in size until it was 
beginning to encroach on the cornea of the left eye 
(R. 15). At the time Dr. Berman examined plaintiff, the 
eye was inflamed and it was his opinion that surgical 
correction was necessary (R. 15). 
The doctor stated that a pterygium might not pro-
gress, but would remain stationary unless the eye itself 
was irritated and an aggravation resulted. He was fur-
ther of the opinion that the pterygium in plaintiff~s eye 
had been aggravated by the flash from the welding 
machine on May 29, 1950 (R.l6). 
As to the rate of progress and growth of the 
pterygium, Dr. Berman stated that anything coming in 
contact with the pterygium would make it grow faster 
and encroach on the cornea, but if nothing aggravated 
it or irritated it, it could remain stationary for years 
(R. 18). It was his opinion that if dust or other fine 
materials were being blown into the eye, that that would 
have a tendency to cause the pterygium to grow (R. 18). 
He was unable to state whether or not the pterygium 
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would have grown to the extent found in July, 1950 
as a result solely of sand and dust striking the eyeball. 
H·e was of the opinion that continuous exposure to dust, 
etc., for approximately two years could possibly cause 
the ·pterygium to increase in size and that such pos-
sibility was present, even though there had been no flash 
burn (R. 21, 22). 
Plaintiff and his wife were both sworn and testified. 
Plaintiff testified that he was a steam shovel operator 
and at said occupation dust and dirt were constantly 
blowing off the shovel and into his face and eyes (R. 23). 
Since 1948, after the operation by Dr. Berman on his 
right eye, plaintiff had worked as a shovel operator. 
He had not been bothered with any eye trouble. The first 
eye difficulty he had was after receiving the flash burn 
(R. 23, 24, 25). After the flash burn, plaintiff's eye 
burned and smarted. The condition got worse every day 
after the first injury on May 29 (R. 26) and by July 12th 
plaintiff could no longer continue with his employment. 
Plaintiff remained off the job from July 12th until 
September 9, 1950 (R. 28). 
Plaintiff's wife, Flossy E. Ewell, testified that be-
tween August ·of 1948 and May of 1950, plaintiff had 
no· trouble with his eyes, but that since May 29, 1950, 
plaintiff had had continuous trouble. She observed on his 
eyeball small blisters, his face and eye were swollen after 
the flash burn (R. 29). Between the 29th of May and 
July 12th, the left eye was continuously inflamed, with 
the lids swollen and the hall of the eye red (R. 30). 
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The rate of growth of the pterygium in the left eye 
was impossible to discover because plaintiff was not 
examined between the 1948 operation and July 14, 1950. 
However, any irritation of the eye would cause the 
pterygium to grow. The commission found that the 
plaintiff had been working during the two years between 
the first eye operation and the second, under conditions 
conducive to the pterygium growth, but because the evi-
dence did not support a finding that the irritation caused 
by the flash accelerated the growth, they denied com-
pensation for the operation and the disability between 
July 21st and September 9, 1950. 
Plaintiff filed his Application for Rehearing within 
the time allowed by law and said application was by the 
Commission denied on April 23, 1951. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PTERYGIUM IN PLAINTIFF'S LEFT EYE WAS 




THE PTERYGIUM IN PLAINTIFF'S LEFT EYE WAS 
THE RESULT OF A COMPENSABLE INDUSTRIAL ACCI-
DENT. 
The Findings of Fact by the commission contain 
the following language : 
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"* * * Applicant's right eye was operated in 
1948, and he was then told that the left eye would 
sooner or later have to be operated." 
And at a later point the opinion again states: 
"* * * The probabilities are that surgery 
would have been necessary whether or not the 
flash incident had taken place." 
From these statements plaintiff deduces that The 
Industrial Commission believed and so found that the 
only effect a flash burn on plaintiff's left eye had, was 
to aggravate the pre-existing condition of the eye and 
since plaintiff could not present evidence that the burn 
caused the pterygium to increase its rate of growth, he 
could not recover for the surgical operation. 
The commission awarded plaintiff workmen's com-
pensation for one week beginning July 14th and ending 
July 21st, it found that plaintiff suffered a compensable 
accident, but refused to allow plaintiff the expense of 
the medical treatment which included the operation per-
formed on July 29th. By refusing to allow plaintiff 
compensation for the disability which occurred between 
July 21st and September 9th, the commission has at-
tempted to delineate between that portion of plaintiff's 
condition which was directly attributable to the flash 
burn and the disability resulting from the condition 
present in his eye on the date of the flash burn. 
Plaintiff submits that the commission has overlooked 
material facts which would require a decision in his 
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favor and an award of the full medical expenses incurred 
by him, as well as the compensation for the total time 
which he was disabled. 
The eye condition from which plaintiff suffered and 
which necessitated the surgical operation was caused by 
either one or two forces acting separately or together: 
(a) Plaintiff's eye condition may have been caused by 
the impact of dust and sand on his eyeball between 
August of 1948 and May 29, 1950; (b) The condition may 
have been caused by the flash burn which occurred on 
May 29, 1950; or (c) It may have been caused in part 
by the sand and dust particles striking the eyeball and 
in part by the flash burn which occurred on May 29, 
1950. 
In respect to the various causes, it is plaintiff's posi-
tion that regardless of whether (a), (b) or (c) caused the 
disability which required the surgical operation, he is 
entitled to full compensation for all disability which he 
has suffered. 
Each and everyone of the causes of the damage to 
plaintiff's eye arose out of or in the course of his employ-
ment and any disability caused by the individual cause 
or by the causes combined and concurring would result in 
a compensable accident to plaintiff. 
It was, at the time of the commission hearing and is 
now, plaintiff's position that the flash burn on May 29, 
1950, accelerated the pterygium in plaintiff's eye and 
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directly necessitated all of the medical treatment which 
he received. But even assuming that The Industrial 
Commission correctly views and understands the law 
applicable to plaintiff's claim, still under the only evi-
dence presented, plaintiff's eye condition and the ptery-
gium existing in his left eye were aggravated by the flash 
burn of May 29th. 
Dr. Berman in stating his op1n1on concerning the 
flash burn and the cause of the pterygium said (R. 16) : 
"I don't think it would solely attribute to that. 
I think the flash had aggravated the condition 
of the pterygium itself or inflammation." 
No other medical evidence was presented before the 
Commission. 
Dr. Berman's testimony when considered with the 
testimony of plaintiff and his wife to the effect that 
during the two years immediately preceding May 29th, 
plaintiff had had no trouble with his left eye, would con-
clusively show that the flash burn irritated and aggra-
vated plaintiff's eye and was the only irritant or ag-
gravation of which he was conscious. The commission 
finds that pterygiums are caused by irritation of the 
tissues of the eyes. 
The commission found that plaintiff while on the 
job during the two years immediately preceding his 
operation was exposed to conditions conducive to the 
growth of the pterygium. Those conditions were the 
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wind, dirt and dust in which he worked while operating 
the power shovel. There was no evidence that the irritat-
ing condition conducive to the growth of the pterygium 
existed at any other place in plaintiff's environment. 
The commission without any evidence indulges in a pre-
sumption that plaintiff was subjected to the same dust 
and dirt outside of his employment after the 1948 opera-
tion. The only reason that the commission could possibly 
have in creating and relying upon such a nonexistent 
presumption is for the purpose of defeating plaintiff's 
claim on some effective ground. 
Since 1922 it has been the law of this state that ari 
injured workman is entitled to compensation not only 
for the disability which directly flowed from an on the 
job injury, but was also entitled to a compensation for 
any disability resulting from an aggravation or accelera-
tion of a diseased bodily condition existing at the time 
when the injury was received. This principle was clearly 
set forth and discussed at length in Pinyon Queen Mining: 
Co., et al. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 59 Utah 402, 
204 P. 323. The decision sets forth the liberal and humane 
principles of law which should govern plaintiff's petition 
in the present case. 
In the Pinyon Queen case the workman had within 
his body a latent syphilitic condition which in no way 
arose out of or was incurred in the course of his employ-
ment. While on the job the workman received an injury 
to his arm and it was stated and admitted that if the 
workman had not been infected with the disease of 
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syphilis, the injury to his arm would have fully recovered 
within a period of six weeks. With the disease present, 
the total disability extended to more than ten weeks. 
The commission awarded compensation for the full ten 
weeks disability, even though they found that the syphili-
tic condition prolonged his disability period. 
This Court in its opinion discussed at length whether 
or not compensation was required for resulting incapa-
<}ity where there was an existing disease aggravated by 
accidental injury. It quoted from many cases from text 
and treatise and finally arrived at the conclusion that 
the commission had properly awarded full compensation 
for all disability, whether the disability directly flowed 
from the injury or was a result of a combining between 
the injury and the latent disease condition. The Pinyon 
Queen case has many authorities quoted therein and has 
been followed and reaffirmed by this Court on many 
occasions since its inception. 
In cases such as Graybar Electric Co., Inc. v. In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, et al., 73 Utah 568, 276 
P. 161, 162 this Court set forth its understanding of the 
principle in the following language: 
"It is no longer an open question in this state 
that, other necessary conditions being present, 
a pre-existing disease or other disturbed condition 
of the physical structure of the body, when aggra-
vated or lighted up by an accident, is compensable 
under the act. Tintic Milling Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, supra. The real point, however, is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
whether or not the strain from lifting which, it is 
alleged, caused or lighted up the sacroiliac condi-
tion, was an accident." 
It has applied the principle in such ~ases as Ham-
mond v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 67, 34 P. 2d .687. 
. . . ' . . . - ( ·. . . '' 
There death was caused by exertion and strain acting 
. . . ' .... 
upon a diseased circulatory system. No att~:q1pt wa~ 
. . . ' I , , • 
made in either the Graybar or Hammond cases to .sepa-
rate the portion of the cause of death attributabl~ to th~ 
immediate accidental injury and that portion which was 
attributable to the latent disease of the inj~;red workman. 
' ·• ~ ~ - ' . ' -' 
In Cherdran Const. Co. v. Simpkins, 61 "Qtah ~93, 
214 P. 593; ther~ was ~gain presented·t~ this ·c~l1rt.th~ 
. ' • l 
problem of whether or not latent physical conditions upon. 
which accid~ntal injury acted to cause death sho~d in 
. ~ . . '
any way affect the amount of the award. Again this 
court reaffirmed the principles set forth in the Pinyon 
Queen case and found that the total result was com-
pensable under our Utah Workmen's Compensation Law. 
See also Gerber v. Industrial Commission, ~1 l!t~ 
479, 64 P. 2d 1281. 
In the light of the foregoing authorities, which have 
clearly set forth the principle that even in cases where 
the accidental injury combines with a disease, which was 
in no way connected with the applicant's employment, 
full compensation should be awarded, it is inconceivable 
that a proper interpretation of the Workmen's Com-
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pensation Laws of the State of Utah would deny com-
pensation for disability caused by two compensable 
accidental injuries. 
The evidence shows without dispute that the flash 
burn on plaintiff's left eye aggravated the condition of 
the eye, causing it to be inflamed and irritated. The only 
other irritative condition on which there was evidence 
was also an on the job type of injury, namely, dust and 
sand blown into plaintiff's eye. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision which 
The Industrial Commission has made is contrary to the 
undisputed substantial evidence presented at the hear-
ings, is arbitrary and capricious and unlawfully defeats 
plaintiff in his substantial rights under Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws. The decision nullifies and destroys the 
liberal humane purposes which worlunen's compensation 
was designed to accomplish. The injustice of the com-
mission's decision can only be appreciated when the size 
of the award which they have refused to make is viewed 
in the light of the limited economic means of plaintiff. 
Vindication of the liberal humane purposes of Work-
men's Compensation legislation demands that this court 
determine that the commission has acted in excess of its 
powers and plaintiff is entitled to an award of compen-
sation for the time which he was disabled and for the 
medical expenses which he incurred in the removal of the 
pterygium from his left eye. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this court should 
determine that the decision of The Industrial Commission 
is in excess of its powers and that plaintiff is entitled 
to an award of full compensation for the time which he 
was disabled between July 21, 1950, and September 9, 
1950, and for the medical expenses incurred by him in the 
surgical removal of the pterygium on his left eye. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DWIGHT L. KING, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
530 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Received .................... copies of the within Brief of 
Appellant this ·-·--··············· day of July, A. D. 1951. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
By ····-····--·---··············································· 
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND 
By ······························································ 
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